

If the ship is operating independently, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make the above listed reports direct to the Chief of Staff and officer with the day's Staff Duty.

(2) If the Commander-in-Chief should be on the Navigating Bridge, the Officer-of-the-Deck will make reports direct to him, reporting thereafter to the Staff Duty Officer on watch.

(3) When underway making passage or outside the usual operating areas the Navigator shall report the ship's position at 0900, 1200 and 2000.

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## EXHIBIT NO. 127

Confidential.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,

NAVAL AIR STATION, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA,

Dec. 18, 1941.

From: Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

Subject: Procurement of Long Range Bombing Landplanes for Patrol Wing Two.

1. Commander Patrol Wing Two has expressed an urgent need for long range landplane bombers, for use initially as patrolling aircraft covering the approaches to Oahu. Further uses of these planes in long range photographic reconnaissance and in offense are many. He has stated further that he has temporarily under his command from the Army a squadron of B-17 airplanes for such operations in conjunction with his VPB's and that for purposes of liaison, indoctrination and familiarization, he is assigning Naval Aviators to those aircraft as second pilots on their joint patrol missions.

2. Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force concurs in the request of Commander Patrol Wing Two and strongly recommends the immediate transfer from Lend Lease or other source of 15 B-17 (Boeing) or B-24 (Consolidated) bombers for this purpose and that an increase in that number in the future, as circumstances and experience may dictate, be considered. With the high speed of these aircraft, the additional area covered during daylight hours on a search adds immeasurably to security. Particularly is this true during the shorter days in winter.

3. Germane to this recommendation is the highly desirable possibility of the early establishment of patrol plane operating facilities at Magdalena Bay, Baja California, from which could be covered effectively the southwest approaches to the United States in conjunction with the patrol being conducted from San Diego. Provision of a squadron of subject landplane bombers in the Hawaiian area might serve to release for operation at Magdalena Bay, one of the three Patrol Squadrons to be equipped presently at Alameda.

4. In view of the current situation, this is being forwarded direct. The approval or comment of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is requested.

J. S. McCAIN.

Copy to: CinCpac, Comscofor, Compatwing 2.

Secret—No. 18

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 22 December, 1941.

In reply refer to:

Memorandum to Roberts Commission:

1. Since my arrival I have issued orders or instructions for security and employment of the Hawaiian Air Force as follows:

a. Ordered immediate wider dispersal of airplanes, supplies and personnel.  
b. Directed surveys to be made of additional fields for operation of aircraft on the Island of Oahu.

c. Required the movement of pursuit into Hickam Field area for more positive protection in the event of adverse weather at the former base at Wheeler Field.

d. Mover obsolescent B-18 and A-20s to Bellows Field to eliminate the airplane congestion at Hickam Field. A-20s were later moved to Wheeler Field.

e. Moved one squadron B-17s to Wheeler Field to further relieve congestion at Hickam Field.

f. Directed that all planes be camouflaged. Those arriving from the mainland to be painted immediately upon arrival.

g. Directed plans be completed for air transport of aircraft ammunition to Maui and Molokai, capable of dispatch on two hours notice.

h. Have issued orders on alerts as follows:

"1. 30 before sunrise to 0800, and one (1) hour before sunset to 30 after sunset 1/3 Army Pursuit and Navy fighters in air.

"All other Army and Navy planes including pursuit excepting searching planes warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

"2. Between 0800 and one (L) hour before sunset:

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit in air.

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

"All other Army and Navy planes including fighters excepting searching planes on one hours notice.

"3. One (1) hour after sunset, 30 minutes before sunrise 1/4 planes on one (1) hours notice, 3/4 on four (4) hours notice."

e. I have visited all operating airdromes, made ground reconnaissance of areas where additional airdromes are to be located, have discussed tactical operations, administrative problems, morale and rewards with all major commanders.

j. I have conferred with Com. Pat. Wing Two and expect to submit to the Department Commander within twenty four hours revised plans for the employment of the Air Force in the Hawaiian area.

k. I have directed that plans be made and they are well underway for the use of certain elements of the Air Force in offensive operations.

l. Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing, directed to have striking force of minimum of 18 b-17's available at all times.

m. Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be arranged.

(S) C. L. Tinker

C. L. TINKER,

*Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

[1] F1  
Confidential

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,  
NAVAL AIR STATION,

*San Diego, California, Dec. 24, 1941.*

From: Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

Subject: Procurement of Four-Engine Land Planes—Request for.

1. Contract 78903 dated 19 November 1940, is for the delivery of 200 PB2Y-3 airplanes. A supplementary contract 78903 dated 30 June 1941, is for the delivery of 54 airplanes, presumably PB2Y-4's. The progress report on this contract submitted by the Inspector of Naval Aircraft, San Diego, for the period ending 30 November 1941, estimates the delivery of the airplanes in quantity in October 1942. These estimated delivery dates are extremely disappointing as four-engine airplanes are urgently required. Experiences with Consolidated Aircraft, would indicate that this October 1942 delivery date will not be anticipated.

2. Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force believes that a part of our patrol aircraft should be long range land plane types. So long as there are prepared fields from which these planes may operate, the advantages to be derived from their operation are numerous. Among them are:

(a) Greater ease and celerity in handling and servicing after flight (a big item when number and fatigue of beach crews is considered).

(b) Quicker to get off on a mission.

(c) Cover larger area in daylight search.

(d) Higher speed and ceiling permits of long range photographic reconnaissance of enemy defended positions with infinitely less hazard.

(e) Greater striking power, particularly in a torpedo attack.

[2] Need for this type has been keenly felt in the last two weeks. The sea-plane, however, still must be used from advanced bases in areas where no landing field exists.

3. A comparison of the performance of the B-24-D, and the PB2Y-3 airplane, which information has been obtained from the specifications, is tabulated below as a matter of interest:

<i>B-24-D</i>	<i>PB2Y-3</i>
Performance @ 41,000# V max @ 25,000 ft. with military power—316 MPH.	Performance @ 66,000# V max @ 20,000 ft.—236 MPH.
Operating speed @ 25,000 ft.—220 MPH.	
Service ceiling—34,000 ft.	Service ceiling—22,300 ft.
Service ceiling any two engines—19,000 feet.	
Range at operational speed carrying 8 1,000# bombs—2,000 miles.	Range at combat load carrying 4 1,000# bombs—2,370 miles.
Bomb Load:	Bomb Load:
4—2,000 lb. or	8—1,000 lb. or
8—1,000 lb. or	8—500 lb.
8—500 lb. or	In addition 4 1,000 lb. bombs can be carried on external tanks.
12—300 lb. or	
20—100 lb.	
Armament:	Armament:
1 .50 cal. Nose gun and 500 rounds	1 .50 cal. bow gun and 400 rounds.
2 .50 cal. top guns (twin mount) and 800 rounds.	2 .50 cal. side waist and 800 rounds.
2 .50 cal. bottom guns (twin mount) and 600 rounds.	1 .50 cal. tunnel and 400 rounds.
2 .50 cal. tail guns (twin mount) and 1,000 rounds.	1 .50 cal. upper waist and 400 rounds.
Total—7 .50 caliber—2,900 rounds ammunition.	2 .50 cal. tail (twin mount) and 800 rounds.
	Total—7 .50 caliber—2,800 rounds ammunition.

[3] 4. This command has been informed by Consolidated Aircraft officials that the B-24-D is now in production, and will be produced in increasing number. Further the B-24-D is a less expensive plane and lends itself to production better than the PB2Y type.

5. Accordingly, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force recommends that negotiations be undertaken with the Army Air Corps to obtain a total of sixty B-24-D airplanes at the earliest opportunity. Whether or not the PB2Y-3 contract could be reduced by that number would depend on the course of events.

/s/ J. S. McCain

Copy to:  
CinCus  
Comscofor

From: CINCPAC  
Date: 4 January 1942.  
For: Coderoom 121Ø  
Decoded by: Graydon  
Paraphrased by: Graydon

5385 K/C  
COMINCH  
PPPPP  
OPNAV  
COMAIRSCOFOR  
COMPATWING 13

Ø41ØØ1 CRØ442

Your Ø11145. Comairscofor 312Ø13. Fully agree. However the necessary detachment patron 22 and nonavailability additional patrol planes from mainland for at least several months makes situation here very critical. Total patrol planes 68, Army heavy bombers 44. Impossible satisfactorily meet simultaneous requirements for effective daily research reasonable air striking force material maintenance and personnel fitness. Best possible results being obtained but

searches far from positive and air striking force too small. Replacement 17 PBY-3 planes here by Army B-24 planes would make vital improvement in situation for both search and striking. Attention this connection invited comairsec for serial 0755 of December 18 with which CINCPAC heartily concurs. Subject fully covered in separate correspondence being forwarded airmail. Crews can be spared from here for taking over and ferrying B-24's. With background patrol plane qualification this can be quickly accomplished. Urgently recommend favorable consideration and immediate initiation action.

Distribution Action COMINCH WAROP 20CP

Record 11 OPD 12 38 NAVAIDE 16 Personal

Top Secret

From: CINCPAC  
Date: 5 January 1942.  
Decoded by: Canning  
Paraphrased by: Reiss

COMINCH  
PPPPPPPP  
OPNAV

050547 CR0804

Withdrawals of Army bombers and Navy patrol planes from this theatre even though temporary for other projects leave us dangerously weak against aircraft carrier and other forms of attack. Retention of Oahu is by no means assured with present available forces. Navy patrol wings should be increased to 144 planes composed of both seaplane and landplane types for maintenance effective search. Carrier squadrons should be filled and kept filled to full allowance of spares to insure maximum effective seaborne striking force. To maintain even present daily search imposes greater load on material and personnel than can be much longer continued. See my 041001. See Commanding General Hawaiian Departments despatch of even date to War Department with which CINCPAC strongly concurs. ComdGen Haw Detp informed by mail.

Distribution

COMINCH. Action

Record Copy—11 12 38 OPDO NAVAIDE 16 Personal

CINCPAC WAROP File 20OF File

WAROPS Secret

Top Secret

## EXHIBIT NO. 128

JAN 4th, 1942.

Air Mail

The Honorable The ATTORNEY GENERAL,  
Washington, D. C.

(Attention: Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General.)

Sir: Reference is made to your letter dated May 22, 1941 in which you asked my opinion concerning the prosecution of the several Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in Hawaii and also my radiogram of May 31, 1941 relative to the same matter.

Immediately after receiving your letter, I contacted Mr. R. L. Shivers, Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Agent F. G. Tillman, who has been assigned to Japanese matters exclusively. Although I have been aware of this general situation for some time, no reports concerning these matters have been submitted to this office. Mr. Shivers brought with him, at my request, a copy of the investigative report of Special Agent F. G. Tillman, dated at Honolulu, March 10, 1941, in reference to ITSUO HAMADA, concerning a violation of the Registration Act. From my conversation with Mr. Shivers and Mr. Tillman and from the information set out in the report, I think that a successful prosecution could be had against this individual and other Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in the Territory if the facts are substantially the same in all of these cases. Mr. Shivers advises me that about forty of these cases have been investigated completely and would be ready for immediate prosecution, and that the facts in the remaining two hundred or so are approximately the same and they could be brought up to date with very little notice.